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Comparing the Costs
of Federal Housing 
Assistance Programs
1. Introduction
or more than sixty years, the federal government has 
provided assistance to improve the condition and reduce 
the cost of rental housing for low- and very low-income 
households.1 The focus of federal assistance has changed over 
time, as illustrated by the major policy reviews of the last four 
decades—the Kaiser Committee in 1968, the President’s 
Commission on Housing in 1982, and the National Housing 
Task Force of 1988. The focus of these reviews shifted from 
increasing the physical quality of the housing stock in the 
Kaiser Committee, to increasing housing affordability in the 
President’s Commission on Housing, to addressing housing 
availability and affordability in the National Housing Task 
Force.2 Production programs dominated federal housing 
policy until the early 1980s. Since then, the voucher program 
has been one of the fastest growing federal housing assistance 
programs.
Although there is little debate that vouchers will remain a 
dominant form of housing assistance, there is still considerable 
debate concerning the appropriate role for production 
programs. A major concern with production programs is their 
cost, particularly when compared with vouchers. Much of the 
housing cost literature cited in this debate is more than twenty 
years old and evaluates production programs that are no longer 
active. In this paper, we describe the housing provided by 
vouchers and five active federal production programs, and 
estimate the total costs of each program. In addition, we 
examine who pays the costs of each program.
Today, six active federal housing programs continue to 
increase the number of households assisted. These programs 
include the Housing Choice Voucher program (housing 
vouchers)—the largest source of federal funds for housing 
assistance—and five production programs, which currently 
receive federal funds to construct or substantially rehabilitate 
units. In this paper, we examine the characteristics of the 
housing provided and the total costs of providing that housing 
under these six active programs:3
• Housing vouchers (produced about 1.6 million 
households) supplement tenants’ rental payments in 
privately owned, moderately priced apartments chosen 
by the tenants.
• Low-income housing tax credits (produced about 
700,000 units) provide tax incentives for private equity 
investment and are often used in conjunction with other 
federal, state, and local government and private 
subsidies in the production of new and rehabilitated 
affordable housing units consistent with state-
determined housing priorities.
• HOPE VI (produced about 65,000 units) provides 
grants—coupled with funds from other federal, state, 
local, and private sources—to revitalize severely 
distressed public housing, support community and 
social services, and promote mixed-income 
communities.4
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• Section 202 (produced about 66,000 units) provides 
grants to develop supportive housing for the elderly and 
project-based rental assistance.5
• Section 811 (produced about 18,000 units) provides 
grants to develop supportive housing for persons with 
disabilities and project-based rental assistance.
• Section 515 (produced about 485,000 units) provides 
below-market loans to support the development of 
housing for families and the elderly in rural areas and 
project-based rental assistance through the Section 521 
program.
The housing provided under the six active federal programs 
can be quite diverse, varying in age, type, size, and in level of 
services and amenities provided. We find that for units of the 
same size and in the same general location, the total costs of 
production programs are greater than the total costs of 
vouchers, but the difference in costs is smaller than suggested 
in earlier literature. In addition, these cost differences generally 
diminish as unit size increases. 
Compared with vouchers, we estimate that the average total 
thirty-year costs of one-bedroom units in metropolitan areas 
range from 8 percent more under the Section 811 program to 
19 percent more under the tax credit program. For three-
bedroom units in metropolitan areas, tax credit units cost an 
average of just 4 percent more than vouchers. HOPE VI is the 
most expensive production program; we estimate that 
HOPE VI units exceed voucher costs by 36 percent. With the 
exception of HOPE VI, total costs are generally similar among 
the production programs. The federal government pays the 
largest share of total costs for all of the housing programs, 
except for tax credits, in which the tenants pay the largest share. 
We also find that the production programs are more expensive 
than housing vouchers for the federal government.
Our work raises a number of housing policy issues. All 
federal housing programs provide benefits beyond housing 
people with low and very low incomes. For example, vouchers 
can increase household mobility while production programs 
can be important components of community development 
strategies. These benefits must be weighed when assessing 
program costs. Analysis of the full costs and benefits of federal 
housing programs require comprehensive, consistent data that 
are not readily available. For example, there is no centralized 
national database that includes information on costs for tax 
credits—the largest housing production program.
In this paper, we first provide background information on 
program expenditures and a brief review of the literature. Next, 
we describe the housing provided under each program and our 
methodology for estimating costs. We then present our total 
cost estimates along with estimates of the share of those costs 
paid by the various actors in the programs. We conclude with a 
discussion of the policy issues raised by our work.
2. Background
Of the approximately 5.2 million renter households assisted by 
the federal government in 1999, about 2.7 million were assisted 
by programs that no longer receive appropriations to produce 
additional units. We refer to these programs as “inactive.” 
Appropriations are, however, provided to fund project-based 
rental assistance, interest reduction payments, and operating 
subsidies for the units developed under these programs in 
previous years. The remaining 2.5 million units are subsidized 
under the six active programs that receive appropriations both 
to add new units and to subsidize units funded in previous 
years. This figure accounts for units that receive subsidies from 
more than one program. More than 10 percent of the total 
units (2.9 million) under the active programs benefit from 
overlapping subsidies. For the tax credit program alone, nearly 
40 percent of the units receive overlapping subsidies from 
various Section 8 rental assistance programs.
In fiscal year 1999, the federal government spent about 
$28.7 billion, including $3.5 billion in tax credits, for both the 
active and inactive housing programs. Of this combined 
amount, about $15.1 billion supported units funded under the 
inactive programs, and about $13.6 billion in budgetary 
outlays and tax credits supported the active programs. Less 
than one-third of the total expenditures went toward the 
construction, rehabilitation, or modernization of affordable 
housing. As shown in Chart 1, the voucher program is the 
largest of the active programs, accounting for about 52 percent 
of federal funding for them. The tax credit program accounts 
for about 26 percent of the federal funding for active programs, 
the HOME program about 10 percent, the Section 202 and 
Section 811 programs together about 5 percent, the 
Section 515 program about 5 percent,6 and the HOPE VI 
program about 2 percent.
Previous studies on the relative costs of housing programs 
have generally found that vouchers are less expensive and more 
cost-effective than production programs. Weicher (1990)7 
reviews the housing cost literature and finds that production 
programs are more expensive than vouchers. Using data provided 
in Wallace et al. (1981),8 Weicher estimates that the Section 8 
New Construction program was 40 percent to 50 percent more 
expensive than the Section 8 Existing Housing program. Olsen 
(2000, 2001)9 also reviews the housing cost literature but uses a 
different approach: he evaluates cost-effectiveness of housing FRBNY Economic Policy Review / June 2003 149
Chart 1
Budgetary Outlays and Tax Expenditures for 
Active and Inactive Housing Assistance Programs
Fiscal Year 1999, in Millions of Dollars
Notes: The total equals $28.7 billion in budgetary outlays and tax 
expenditures. Outlays for Section 8 project-based include new 
construction/substantial rehabilitation, loan management set-aside,
property disposition, Section 236, and rent supplement. Outlays for
“Other” include Section 202, Section 811, Section 515, Section 521, 


















programs by comparing their total cost of providing assisted 
housing and their estimated market value. Olsen (2001) finds 
that the studies reviewed unanimously conclude that vouchers 
are more cost-effective than production programs such as 
Public Housing, Section 8 New Construction, and 
Section 236.10 His review concludes, “whether there are any 
market conditions under which construction programs are 
more cost-effective than vouchers is surely one of the most 
important unanswered questions in housing policy analysis.” 
The reviews by Weicher and Olsen illustrate that much of the 
housing cost literature is more than twenty years old, and, as a 
result, focuses on older production programs that are no longer 
active. Little recent work has been done to compare costs across 
current programs, in part because of the lack of consistent, 
detailed cost data across these programs, as we will discuss. 
A goal of this paper is to begin to fill that void.
3. Housing Characteristics
of Federal Housing Programs
Housing vouchers are used almost exclusively in existing 
properties whose median age nationwide is about thirty-five 
years, ranging from about sixty-five years in the Northeast to 
about thirty years in the West. According to U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) data, about three-
quarters of vouchers are used in multifamily dwellings, and the 
remainder is used in single-family homes. Production program 
properties are either newly constructed or substantially 
rehabilitated. For example, the HOPE VI program replaces or 
renovates severely distressed public housing developments as 
part of a broader community revitalization strategy. The new 
or rehabilitated properties often include special design features 
that are intended to integrate the public housing community 
with the neighborhood. HOPE VI properties, which have an 
average of nearly 300 units, span the full range of building 
types, from detached homes to row houses to elevator 
buildings.
The tax credit and Section 811 programs also provide newly 
constructed and substantially rehabilitated properties. Most 
tax credit properties are multifamily buildings, including 
single-room-occupancy dwellings, walk-up apartments, town 
houses and row houses, and elevator buildings, and have an 
average of seventy-five units.11 Section 811 properties are 
predominantly of two types—independent living projects and 
group homes. Independent living projects generally provide 
separate apartments with individual kitchens and bathrooms, 
while group homes typically include a bedroom for each 
resident and a common kitchen, dining, and living area. 
Section 811 properties range from single-family dwellings to 
walk-up apartments and have an average of about twelve units. 
Section 811 group homes normally do not house more than six 
persons.
Finally, the Section 202 and Section 515 programs primarily 
provide newly constructed properties. Section 202 properties 
are generally mid- and high-rise buildings with elevators, 
averaging forty-five units nationwide, whereas most 
Section 515 properties are walk-up apartments and often 
consist of no more than twenty-four units, which is a size 
consistent with the lower population densities of rural areas.
Across the six active programs, units vary in their average 
size (as measured by the number of bedrooms) and 
distribution across size, as shown in Chart 2. The average 
number of bedrooms ranges from 1.0 for the Section 202 and 
Section 811 programs to 2.4 for the HOPE VI program. 
Vouchers and tax credits provide higher percentages of larger 
family units, while the Section 515 program includes a 
combination of larger units for families and smaller units for 
the elderly.
Most assisted housing is in metropolitan areas but the 
location of properties varies somewhat by program. As Chart 3 
indicates, all HOPE VI units are in metropolitan areas, with 
about 90 percent in central cities. In addition, about 94 percent 
of tax credit units12 and about 80 percent of voucher, 
Section 202, and Section 811 units are in metropolitan areas. 































Note: The average number of bedrooms appears in parentheses.
Chart 2
Distribution and Average Size of Units 






























Demographic Characteristics of Neighborhoods
Where Assisted Housing Is Located
Notes: The data for poverty indicate the percentage of neighborhood 
households with incomes below a certain threshold adjusted for 
family size as determined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The chart 
excludes data for Section 515 units because the addresses of 













units are in central cities. By contrast, nearly 70 percent of 
Section 515 units are in rural nonmetropolitan areas, with the 
balance in the rural parts of metropolitan areas.
The neighborhoods where assisted housing is located also 
vary. The census tracts where HOPE VI units are found are 
poorer than the census tracts where other program units are 
located. HOPE VI census tracts also have higher percentages of 
minority households and lower percentages of homeowners. 
In general, the demographic characteristics of the census tracts 
where other program properties are located are fairly similar, 
as shown in Chart 4.
In addition to providing a range of property types with units 
of different sizes in different locations, the six active programs 
vary in the extent to which they make supportive services 
and amenities available to assisted households. In general, 
supportive services are not an integral part of the voucher, tax 
credit, and Section 515 programs. However, when individual 
tax credit and Section 515 properties serve households with 
special needs, such as the elderly or persons with disabilities, 
they may provide services and amenities similar to those 
provided in Section 202 and Section 811 properties. 
Section 202 properties typically include congregate dining 
facilities, and both Section 202 and Section 811 properties 
include common rooms and may make transportation, 
housekeeping, and health care services available. The HOPE VI 
program emphasizes services, allowing up to 15 percent of the 
HOPE VI grant to be used for community and supportive 
services. For example, HOPE VI developments often include 
employment or job training centers as well as facilities for 
children. Production program units are more likely to have 
modern amenities, whereas voucher units typically have 
amenities characteristic of older rental properties. In addition, 
although it is expected that new units under the production 
programs start out in better condition than the older units 
under the voucher program, over time, the condition of these 
new units, as well as of existing units, depends on the level of 
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4. Methodology for Comparing 
Program Costs
For this analysis, we constructed the total costs of a unit under 
each program, regardless of who bears the costs. In the private 
rental housing market, rents cover the total costs of providing a 
housing unit. The total costs include operating expenses (for 
example, administrative expenses, utilities, routine maintenance, 
and property taxes), debt service, deposits to a replacement 
reserve for major capital improvements over time, and a 
market return to equity investors. We defined the total costs of 
vouchers as the present discounted value (PDV) of the total 
rent paid by both the federal government and the assisted 
household plus the fee paid by HUD to the local housing 
authority to administer the program:
total voucher costs = PDV (rents + administrative fee).
For production programs, costs are more complicated 
because an asset with a long useful life is produced. In the 
private housing market, the value of the housing equals the 
PDV of the net rental income stream over the useful life:13
value = PDV (net rental income).
The rental income stream must cover the total costs:14
PDV (rental income) = total costs = total development costs
 + PDV (operating costs).
In the private market, if the PDV of market rents does not 
cover total costs, the housing development will not be built. 
Federal production programs generally provide housing at 
below-market rents or provide housing in locations where 
market rents would be insufficient to cover costs. In either case, 
the difference between total rents paid and total costs is covered 
by development subsidies. Therefore, for production 
programs:
total production program costs = PDV (rental income) 
+ PDV (development subsidies).
For both vouchers and the production programs, our 
estimates of total costs recognize that rents are paid over many 
years and development subsidies are paid either up front or 
over many years. Vouchers are short-term commitments to 
provide housing assistance, while production programs 
provide units with certain restrictions to ensure that the units 
will remain affordable in the future, often more than thirty 
years. To account for differences in the timing of investments 
under the various programs, we estimated their thirty-year life-
cycle costs. Longer time frames for the life cycle tend to favor 
production programs in terms of costs because of the impact of 
rent inflation over time.15
Vouchers and the production programs are subject to and 
insulated from different cost risks over time. Whereas vouchers 
are vulnerable to inflation in market rents, the production 
programs are less vulnerable because of federal regulations or 
limits on rents associated with development subsidies. 
However, the production programs can pose substantial cost 
risks if capital reserves are underfunded, as they often have 
been in the past. Vouchers pose no such risk because the federal 
government has no commitment to specific units.
Both the voucher and the production programs are subject 
to cost-containment guidelines. For the voucher program, 
HUD sets payment standards that are based on fair market 
rents for more than 2,700 market areas, taking into account 
unit size (by number of bedrooms). These payment standards 
are intended to give assisted households a selection of units and 
neighborhoods while containing costs. Public housing 
authorities can ask HUD to increase the payment standard if 
they believe increases are warranted. For the production 
programs, the cost-containment guidelines are designed to 
provide properties of modest design. These guidelines may 
establish cost limits that vary by location, type of building (for 
example, elevator or garden-style), and unit size, or they may 
simply require assurances that the costs of proposed properties 
are reasonable.
Table 1 presents the average total development costs for the 
production programs by general location and for seven 
metropolitan areas. Information on housing vouchers does not 
appear in the table because the program relies on existing 
housing. Nationally and in most metropolitan areas, the total 
development costs are considerably higher for HOPE VI than 
for the other production programs. It is important to note that 
HOPE VI is a small program with few projects per metro-
politan area; the HOPE VI figures for most of our seven 
metropolitan areas incorporate data for only two develop-
ments. As a result, the average for a particular metropolitan 
area can be skewed by the presence of large projects with high 
or low development costs. In the New York City metropolitan 
area, for example, one very large HOPE VI development 
involved rehabilitation, which can cost much less than new 
construction, and, consequently, the average HOPE VI 
development cost for New York City is unusually low. At the 
same time, three HOPE VI properties in the Baltimore metro-
politan area involving new construction had development costs 
very similar to each other.
For some programs, the entire development cost is 
subsidized with up-front grants, while for others, it is 
subsidized over time with tax credits or below-market interest- 
rate loans. Table 2 shows our estimates of the present 152 Comparing the Costs of Federal Housing Assistance Programs
Table 1
Average Total Development Costs per Unit by General Location and for Seven Metropolitan Areas
In 1999 Dollars
HOPE VIa
Location Tax Credits Housing-Related All Costs Section 202 Section 811 Section 515
Nation 73,590 117,920 143,450 73,510 70,430 58,280
Metro 75,690 117,920 143,450 75,430 73,020 b
Nonmetro 62,010 bb 60,270 63,120 58,280
Seven metro areas
Baltimore 77,360 166,380 221,210 80,250 69,420 b
Boston 116,710 197,000 261,610 94,160 96,000 b
Chicago 79,340 102,470 108,950 75,020 71,370 b
Dallas-Fort Worth 60,100 78,920 96,460 52,390 66,710 b
Denver 72,650 102,170 126,440 72,160 74,640
Los Angeles 104,750 113,060 154,310 94,360 97,520 b
New York City 111,580 76,710 107,010 101,730 116,180 b
a The total development costs for HOPE VI reflect mostly planned figures. Housing-related costs exclude the costs of remediation, demolition, the 
construction of housing and community facilities, relocation, and community-based planning and participation, most of which are not applicable to the 
other housing programs. These other expenses are included in the “All Costs” column.
b The program generally does not build units in these areas.
Table 2
Average Present Discounted Value of Development Subsidies per Unit by General Location 
and for Seven Metropolitan Areas
In 1999 Dollars
HOPE VIa
Location Tax Credits Housing-Related All Costs Section 202a Section 811a  Section 515
Nation 50,350 117,920 143,450 73,510 70,430 41,730
Metro 52,790 117,920 143,450 75,430 73,020 b
Nonmetro 44,690 bb 60,270 63,120 41,730
Seven metro areas
Baltimore 51,780 166,380 221,210 80,250 69,420 b
Boston 50,630 197,000 261,610 94,160 96,000 b
Chicago 62,190 102,470 108,950 75,020 71,370 b
Dallas-Fort Worth 31,470 78,920 96,460 52,390 66,710 b
Denver 29,080 102,170 126,440 72,160 74,640 b
Los Angeles 81,380 113,060 154,310 94,360 97,520 b
New York City 111,780 76,710 107,010 101,730 116,180 b
aFor the HOPE VI, Section 202, and Section 811 programs, total costs are paid entirely up front and no debt service payments are made for these units.  
As a result, the total development subsidies equal the total development costs.
b The program generally does not build units in these areas.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / June 2003 153
discounted value of the average development subsidies per unit 
in 1999 for the five production programs, both for the nation 
and for seven metropolitan areas. For HOPE VI, Section 202, 
and Section 811, the federal government pays the total 
development costs up front with grants; as a result, the 
development subsidies are equal to the total development costs. 
Section 515 provides below-market fixed-rate loans of 
1 percent with fifty-year terms. To estimate the value of the 
subsidy provided through a below-market interest-rate loan, 
we took the present discounted value of the difference in the 
interest payments over thirty years between the rate on the 
constant-maturity treasuries—which is a very conservative 
indicator of market interest rates—and the actual loan. We 
assumed the project would be sold in year thirty. For tax 
credits, the federal government provides investors with a flow 
of tax credits over ten years. In addition, state and local 
governments or private entities may provide grants or below-
market loans. For tax credits, the present discounted value of 
the development subsidies is the sum of the present discounted 
value of the flow of the tax credits, any grants provided, and the 
present discounted value of the flow of the interest subsidies on 
any below-market loans.16 
As shown in Table 2, the development subsidies for the tax 
credit and Section 515 programs are generally lower than for 
the HOPE VI, Section 202, and Section 811 programs, whose 
total development costs are covered by federal grants. How-
ever, the development subsidies for tax credit properties in the 
New York City metropolitan area are quite high. In New York 
City, the city government provides all first mortgages on tax 
credit projects at steep discounts, substantially increasing the 
level of development subsidies. In the Los Angeles metro-
politan area, state and local governments have given priority to 
tax credit proposals for single-room-occupancy developments 
and have provided substantial subsidies.
The development subsidies provided with production 
programs have resulted in below-market rents. Although 
deeper development subsidies can cover the cost of building 
in certain markets or of additional amenities, deeper 
development subsidies can also lower rents, making units 
affordable for lower income tenants. For the HOPE VI, 
Section 202, and Section 811 programs, rents need only cover 
operating costs and replacement reserves, since up-front 
federal grants pay the total development costs. For the tax 
credit and Section 515 programs, under which rents must 
cover debt service payments for the portion of the development 
costs that are financed, rents are somewhat higher than for the 
other production programs but are still generally below market 
rents. As shown in Table 3, voucher rents, which include both 
the tenant and federal contributions, are higher than rents for 
the five housing production programs.
Table 3
Average Monthly Rents by General Location and for Seven Metropolitan Areas
In 1999 Dollars 
Production Program
Location Housing Vouchersa  Tax Credits HOPE VIb Section 202 Section  811 Section 515
Nation 610 540 430 340 320 380
Metro 650 530 430 350 340 d
Nonmetro 440 450 c 300 280 380
Seven metro areas
Baltimore 630 510 c 380 250 d
Boston 880 820 c 420 470 d
Chicago 640 500 c 470 450 d
Dallas-Fort Worth 650 670 c 310 310 d
Denver 710 700 c 290 350 d
Los Angeles 730 440 c 380 440 d
New York City 750 430 c 490 550 d
a For vouchers, the average rent does not include a monthly administrative fee, which, at the national level, averages about $48 per unit and, in the seven  
metropolitan areas, ranges from $42 per unit in Denver to $61 per unit in Los Angeles.
b Our estimate of HOPE VI rent is based on the national average operating subsidy plus tenant contribution. 
cFor individual metropolitan areas, reliable cost data were not available.
dBecause Section 515 units are located in rural areas, rent data are presented for nonmetropolitan areas only.154 Comparing the Costs of Federal Housing Assistance Programs
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Chart 5
Estimated Total Thirty-Year Costs of One-Bedroom 
Units by General Location
Note: Because Section 515 is a rural program, we present our cost 
















Estimated Total Thirty-Year Costs of Two-Bedroom 
Units by General Location
Notes: Section 202 is not included in this analysis because it produces
mainly efficiencies and one-bedroom units. Because Section 515 is 








Section 515 Section 811 Tax credits Vouchers
Unlike the production program rents, which have been 
reduced by development subsidies, the voucher rents are 
consistent with market rents. The size of the voucher subsidy is 
determined generally by the difference between the unit’s 
rent—generally not to exceed the fair market rent (FMR)—and 
30 percent of tenant income. FMRs are set by HUD for local 
markets countrywide to reflect the rent for modest housing. 
They represent the 40th percentile of the distribution of rents 
paid by recent movers for units of a given size. For example, in 
1999, the FMR for a two-bedroom unit in Chicago was $735; 
rents for units occupied by voucher recipients averaged about 
$605 for a two-bedroom unit in Chicago, 18 percent below the 
FMR.
5. Total Costs of Production
Programs and Vouchers
In both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas, the average 
total per-unit cost of each of the production programs exceeds 
the cost of providing a voucher for a unit with the same 
number of bedrooms. To control the impact of unit size on 
costs, we compared the costs of units with the same number of 
bedrooms across programs. We focused on one- and two-
bedroom units because they are provided under most of the 
programs and generally account for more than 60 percent of 
each program’s units. (We could not include HOPE VI, the 
program with the largest average unit size, in this analysis 
because data were not available to present total cost by unit 
size.) As shown in Chart 5, in metropolitan areas, the total 
thirty-year life-cycle costs range from $139,520 for vouchers 
to $166,610 for tax credits. Compared with vouchers, the 
production programs cost from 8 percent more for Section 811 
units to 19 percent more for tax credit units. In nonmetro-
politan areas, the life-cycle costs range from $95,890 for 
vouchers to $138,060 for tax credits, and, compared with 
vouchers, the production programs cost from 35 percent more 
for Section 811 units to 44 percent more for tax credit units.17
The drop in total cost from metropolitan to nonmetro-
politan areas for one-bedroom units is greatest for the voucher 
program. Vouchers in nonmetropolitan areas cost 31 percent 
less than vouchers in metropolitan areas. For the production 
programs, nonmetropolitan units cost from 14 percent less 
than metropolitan units under Section 811 to 17 percent less 
under tax credits.
As shown in Chart 6, examining the costs of two-bedroom 
units yields similar results. In metropolitan areas, the total 
thirty-year life-cycle costs range from $161,650 for the voucher 
program to $184,130 for the tax credit program. Compared 
with vouchers, the production programs cost from 6 percent 
more for Section 811 units to 14 percent more for tax credit 
units. In nonmetropolitan areas, the production programs cost 
from 20 percent more for Section 515 units to 38 percent more 
for tax credit units. Again, the drop in total costs from 
metropolitan to nonmetropolitan areas for two-bedroom units 
is greatest for the voucher program.
For units with more than two bedrooms, cost data were 
available for two programs—tax credits and vouchers. We 
estimate that the total cost of three-bedroom units in 
metropolitan areas is about $203,510 for tax credits and FRBNY Economic Policy Review / June 2003 155
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Chart 7
Estimated Total Thirty-Year Costs of One-Bedroom 
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$196,470 for vouchers—a difference of about 4 percent. In 
nonmetropolitan areas, the total cost is about $179,400 for tax 
credits and $131,580 for vouchers—a difference of about 
36 percent.
In the seven metropolitan areas we reviewed, one- and two-
bedroom production program units are also more expensive 
than one- and two-bedroom voucher units, respectively. 
However, as Chart 7 shows, there is considerable variation 
across metropolitan areas. In Boston, for example, the 
differences in costs between vouchers and production 
programs are small; the costs of one-bedroom tax credit units, 
on average, are 7 percent greater than the costs for one-
bedroom voucher units. In contrast, in Denver, tax credit units 
are nearly 40 percent more costly than voucher units. Across 
production programs, total costs are quite similar in Baltimore 
and Boston. In Denver and Los Angeles, however, the variation 
in production program costs is considerably greater.
We could not include the HOPE VI program in Charts 5-7  
because data were not available to present total costs by unit 
size. However, the total cost of an average HOPE VI unit, with 
2.4 bedrooms, is $223,190, which includes only housing-
related construction costs. We estimate that the average 
voucher cost of a 2.4-bedroom voucher unit is $175,577.18 
According to these estimates, the HOPE VI program is about 
27 percent more expensive than the voucher program. If the 
cost of remediation, demolition, construction of housing and 
community facilities, relocation, and community-based 
planning and participation—in addition to housing-related 
construction costs—were included, the total thirty-year cost of 
the program would be $248,720, or 42 percent more expensive 
than vouchers.
With the exception of HOPE VI, the average total costs are 
very similar across production programs. For one-bedroom 
units in metropolitan areas, the average thirty-year cost of the 
most expensive program (tax credits) is 10 percent greater than 
that of the least expensive one (Section 811). In nonmetro-
politan areas, the difference in the average total cost for 
one-bedroom units between the most expensive program (tax 
credits) and the least expensive one (Section 811) is even 
smaller—only 6 percent. The average total costs of two-
bedroom units are also similar across production programs in 
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas.
The total cost of HOPE VI, however, varied greatly from the 
other production programs. When we estimated only housing-
related construction costs, the average total cost for all units 
under the HOPE VI program was about 35 percent greater 
than a two-bedroom tax credit unit and 10 percent greater than 
a three-bedroom tax credit unit. If all other construction costs 
were included, it would increase the spread in total cost 
between HOPE VI and tax credits by roughly 15 percentage 
points.
Total per-unit costs of the voucher and production 
programs vary across individual properties, even within the 
same metropolitan area. This is primarily because of variations 
in the rents charged for the voucher program and the 
development costs for the production programs.19 For 
example, in the Boston metropolitan area, the market rents for 
two-bedroom voucher units range from about $540 to $1,300 
per month, and the average total development costs of two-
bedroom tax credit units range from about $44,800 to $293,340 
per unit.
Neighborhood characteristics may influence market rents 
and total development costs (in particular, the value of land). 
Under the voucher program, variations in market rents within 
a metropolitan area for similar-sized units may be influenced 
by neighborhood differences such as quality of schools, crime 
rates, pollution, and proximity to jobs and shopping centers.20 
Market rents may also be influenced by the quality of the 
property and the amenities and services offered. Under the 
production programs, variations in total development costs 
within a metropolitan area reflect not only differences in 
neighborhoods but also in property and unit amenities, project 
sponsors, program requirements, and a host of other factors.21
For HOPE VI and tax credits, we find high-cost properties 
located in very low-income neighborhoods where market rents 
would be insufficient to generate new construction. Often, 
production programs, by design, build housing in 
neighborhoods where the market would not. There may be 
additional costs of building in these neighborhoods. Additional 
costs may also result from compliance with federal wage and 




















Shares of Total Thirty-Year Costs of One-Bedroom
Units Paid by the Federal Government, Tenants, 
and Others
Percent
Notes: The cost shares for HOPE VI are for all units, not one-
bedroom units, because the program does not break out costs by the 
number of bedrooms. The chart presents data on average cost shares 
for the nation, which are similar to those for metropolitan and 
nonmetropolitan areas. “Other” includes state, local, and private 
funding sources.
developments must follow these federal regulations, including 
the Davis-Bacon Act and Section 3 requirements to hire small 
and minority contractors. In addition, HOPE VI must follow 
resident participation requirements. For example, in an 
interview with the authors, HOPE VI program officials report 
that Davis-Bacon alone, which requires construction workers 
to receive locally prevailing wages and fringe benefits, can 
increase construction costs by as much as 25 percent, 
depending on the local construction labor market. Finally, 
higher costs can result from participation of less experienced 
developers, such as housing authorities or neighborhood 
groups that may be less efficient than larger developers who 
have better construction management capacity.22 For example, 
HOPE VI officials recognized that, unlike private-sector 
developers, many housing authorities hire program managers 
and construction managers to oversee HOPE VI 
developments, which can increase costs. Nonetheless, it is 
doubtful that these factors alone account for the high costs of 
the most expensive projects in our database, some of which 
exceed $200,000 per unit.
Actual total costs for the production programs are 
somewhat higher than our estimates because our estimates do 
not reflect the value of abated property taxes or shortfalls in 
capital reserves. Under each production program, some 
properties receive tax abatements, and, historically, sufficient 
reserves for capital replacements and improvements have not 
been set aside.23 Although data were not available to estimate 
the additional costs of property tax abatements and capital 
reserve shortfalls for individual properties, we estimated, on 
the basis of industry averages, that under a worst-case scenario 
(for example, full tax abatements and no payments to reserves), 
the thirty-year total costs would be understated by nearly 
15 percent.24 This scenario is most applicable to the HOPE VI 
program, in which full property taxes are not paid and capital 
reserves are not fully funded. Under the other four production 
programs, many properties fund capital reserves and pay full 
property taxes. For these programs, our cost estimates are likely 
to be understated by less than 15 percent.
Overall, our cost comparisons show the voucher program to 
be less expensive than production programs, a result consistent 
with the previous literature. However, in general, our results 
show a smaller gap between voucher costs and production costs 
than in many of the previous studies. This difference may be 
due, at least in part, to differences in methodology. Many of the 
earlier studies compared costs in the first year rather than over 
the life cycle. For example, Mayo (1980) estimated that the 
costs of new construction programs exceeded existing housing 
by 82 percent, a figure often cited. This estimate is based on 
first-year costs. However, that study also provides forty-year 
life-cycle estimates that show production costs ranging from 
29 percent to 46 percent more than existing housing.25 In 
addition, the production programs examined in previous 
studies are very different from those included in this analysis. 
Today’s production programs may be more efficient than 
previous production programs.
6. The Federal Government and
Tenants Pay the Largest Shares
of Total Costs 
The federal government pays most of the total costs for all 
of the programs with the exception of tax credits, for which 
tenants pay the largest share of total costs. As Chart 8 shows, 
the federal share, as a percentage of total thirty-year costs, is 
about 65 percent for vouchers; 60 percent for Section 515; and 
70 percent for HOPE VI, Section 202, and Section 811. The 
federal share is the smallest for tax credits—about 40 percent.
As Chart 8 also shows, tenants contribute between 
21 percent (HOPE VI) and 54 percent (tax credits) of the total 
housing costs over a period of thirty years. The tenant share for 
each of the programs is dependent on the average income of the 
households served and the average portion of this income paid 
for rent. The more the assisted households pay, the less the 
federal government needs to contribute.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / June 2003 157
Thousands of dollars
Chart 9
Average Annual Incomes of Households Served 
under the Six Active Programs
Sources: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Multifamily Tenant Characteristics System and A Picture of 





















Comparison of Federal Cost of One-Bedroom 
Units in Metro Areas
Production Programs versus Vouchers Adjusted
for Household Income and Rent Burden
Notes: Because Section 515 properties are located in rural areas, they 
are not included in this chart. Due to data limitations, HOPE VI cost 
data reflect the average for all units, not one-bedroom units. It is not 
appropriate to compare across production programs because
the assumed tenant rental contribution for housing vouchers is
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As Chart 9 indicates, compared with the other programs, tax 
credit households have the highest average income, about 
$14,150 (in 1999 dollars),26 and pay the largest portion of their 
income for rent—about 35 percent overall—compared with 
about 30 percent for most of the households assisted through 
the other programs.27 As a result, the tenant share of total costs 
is the largest for the tax credit program. The other active 
housing programs target households with lower average 
incomes, and, therefore, tenants in these programs pay a 
smaller share of the average total per-unit costs. Most of these 
households receive rental assistance and generally pay about 
30 percent of their income for rent, leaving the federal 
government and, to a far lesser extent other subsidy providers, 
to cover the remaining costs. Chart 9 displays the average 
incomes of the households assisted through the six active 
programs.
If we assume that voucher households have incomes equal 
to those in the tax credit program28 and if both groups of 
tenants pay the same percentage of their income for rent, it 
would cost the federal government about 30 percent more for 
the tax credit program than for housing vouchers for a one-
bedroom unit in metropolitan areas (Chart 10). Similarly, if 
the average incomes of the other production programs and 
voucher households are equal and if both groups of tenants pay 
the same percentage of their income for rent, it would cost the 
federal government, in metropolitan areas, from 7 percent 
more for Section 811 to 16 percent more for Section 202 for 
one-bedroom units over thirty years. For two-bedroom units, 
it costs the federal government, in metropolitan areas, 
2 percent more for Section 811 and 15 percent more for tax 
credits. The federal cost of an average-size HOPE VI unit 
(2.4 bedrooms) is 24 percent more than vouchers, and if all 
costs including housing-related expenses were considered, the 
federal cost of HOPE VI would be 43 percent more.29 We also 
estimated the federal cost of three-bedroom units, where data 
were available, and found that tax credit units in metropolitan 
areas cost the federal government 3p e r c e n t  l e s s  t h a n  v o u c h e r s .
In nonmetropolitan areas, the differences in the 
comparative federal cost of vouchers and production programs 
are greater. For example, the federal cost of one-bedroom tax 
credit units is about 180 percent more than the federal cost of 
vouchers in nonmetropolitan areas, compared with about 
30 percent more in metropolitan areas (Chart 11). The thirty-
year federal costs for the other production programs are from 
57 percent (Section 811) to 67 percent (Section 202) greater 
than for vouchers in nonmetropolitan areas. For two-bedroom 
units, it costs the federal government, in nonmetropolitan 
areas, 103 percent more for tax credits. For the other programs, 
the federal costs in nonmetropolitan areas are 28 percent 
greater for Section 811 and 39 percent greater for Section 515. 
Finally, the federal cost of three-bedroom tax credit units in 
nonmetropolitan areas is 102 percent more than vouchers.
Contributions from state, local, and private sources, as 
shown in Chart 8, cover a small share of the total costs of the 
production programs.30 At the national level, these contri-158 Comparing the Costs of Federal Housing Assistance Programs
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Chart 11
Comparison of Federal Cost of One-Bedroom 
Units in Nonmetro Areas
Production Programs versus Vouchers Adjusted
for Household Income and Rent Burden
Note: Because HOPE VI properties are located exclusively in metro 
areas, they are not included in this chart. It is not appropriate to 
compare across production programs because the assumed tenant 
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butions do not exceed, on average, 7 percent over thirty years. 
This percentage, however, would be somewhat higher if data 
were available to account for the impact of property tax 
abatements, as previously discussed in this paper.
Even though the share of total costs paid by these sources is, 
on average, small, we identified state and local subsidies that, in 
certain locations, had a significant impact on rents or federal 
costs. For example, a comparison of the subsidies provided to 
properties in the New York City and Boston metropolitan areas 
demonstrates the impact of a significant nonfederal subsidy. As 
shown in Table 4, the average contribution from state, local, 
and private sources for a two-bedroom tax credit unit was 
more than five times greater in New York City than in Boston. 
At the same time, both the total and federal per-unit costs were 
about the same for both cities. Because of the difference in 
subsidies from state, local, and private sources, the average 
monthly rent paid by a tax credit household was about $850 in 
Boston and about $450 in New York City—a difference of 
nearly 90 percent. The primary reason for the difference in tax 
credit rents is that New York City provides virtually all of the 
mortgages for tax credit properties, at rates averaging about 
1 percent—a very significant subsidy. Conversely, in the 
Boston metropolitan area, the state provides about two-thirds 
of the mortgages at interest rates that are very close to market 
rates. In addition, rent reductions resulting from state and local 
subsidies present opportunities to lower the federal cost of 
providing rental assistance to these units.
Our data also allow us to compare the total government 
(federal, state, and local) costs of production programs and 
vouchers, while making the same assumptions concerning 
household income and rent burdens as in the federal cost 
comparisons.31 Given the emphasis placed on “leveraging” 
different sources of funding by many of the production 
programs (including, most recently, Section 202), analyzing 
total government costs offers some perspective on public 
expenditures on affordable housing. Compared with vouchers, 
total government costs for a one-bedroom unit under the 
production programs in metropolitan areas are higher by 
12 percent for Section 811, 20 percent for Section 202, and 
53 percent for tax credits. The total government costs for an 
average-size unit under HOPE VI are 37 percent greater than 
the cost for vouchers. In nonmetropolitan areas, the total 
government costs for a one-bedroom unit under the 
production programs, compared with vouchers, are higher by 
60 percent for Section 811, 67 percent for Section 202, 
75 percent for Section 515, and 214 percent for tax credits. The 
differentials in total government costs are similar for two-
bedroom units.
7. Housing Policy Issues
If costs were the only consideration, our estimates would 
suggest that the production programs should be replaced with 
vouchers. However, federal housing programs deliver 
additional benefits that must be taken into account when 
addressing costs. Voucher recipients can choose housing in 
neighborhoods that offer better educational and employment 
opportunities, or they can choose to remain in place while 
paying less for rent. In many markets, production programs are 
Table 4
Impact of Contributions from State, Local, and 
Private Sources on Thirty-Year Average Costs of 




and Private Tenant Total
Boston 100,060 10,180 153,740 263,980
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the only sources of new affordable rental units, and restrictions 
on use will keep these units affordable for decades to come, 
limiting the impact of market forces. These units can be crucial, 
especially when housing markets are tight or landlords are 
unwilling to rent to voucher recipients. Certain housing 
authorities have found that the fair market rents in some 
metropolitan areas are too low, making it difficult for voucher 
recipients to find housing. As a result, vouchers are being 
returned to housing authorities. A 2001 HUD study found that, 
based on a sample of forty-eight metropolitan areas, about 
one-third of the households who received vouchers in 2000 
were not able to lease a unit—a substantial increase from 
HUD’s 1993 estimate of 19 percent.32
In addition, there are substantial differences in the housing 
and services provided under each of the production programs 
that must also be considered. For example, the Section 202 and 
Section 811 programs make available services that are not 
readily found in affordable housing in the private rental 
market. These services can be particularly important for frail, 
elderly residents or persons with disabilities for whom housing 
vouchers are probably not a reasonable alternative. As the 
nation’s population ages, production programs for the elderly 
may become an even more important part of national housing 
policy. Finally, in many urban areas, the production programs 
have formed an integral part of an overall community 
development strategy. As a matter of public policy, the benefits 
of mobility, increasing the supply of affordable units,33 
providing additional services for special-needs populations, or 
revitalizing distressed communities must be weighed against 
the costs of these efforts.
As shown in this paper, the federal government and tenants 
cover the majority of costs for both the voucher and 
production programs. The share of costs covered by the federal 
government increases as tenant income declines. The bottom 
line is that housing very low-income households is expensive 
for the federal government under both the voucher and 
production programs because those tenants can shoulder only 
a very small portion of the costs. To shift more of the cost 
burden to tenants without creating an affordability problem, 
the programs would have to serve higher income households.
In some instances, increasing contributions from state and 
local sources may be an option for limiting federal expendi-
tures for some of the production programs, as our discussion 
of New York City’s mortgage interest subsidy indicates. 
Substantial subsidies from these sources could eliminate or 
reduce the need for federal rental assistance, freeing federal 
funds to assist other households. However, state and local 
governments vary in their ability and willingness to support 
affordable housing. Federal incentives, such as additional tax 
credit or grant awards for major financial commitments, might 
promote greater nonfederal participation.
Further research on the adherence of projects to cost-
containment guidelines could identify opportunities for 
controlling development costs. Our data on the production 
programs show wide variation in the development costs of 
projects under the same program in the same metropolitan 
area. Although the higher costs of some units reflect the cost 
differential between new construction and rehabilitation or the 
premiums paid for special features, the reasons for the higher 
costs of other units are less obvious. Understanding the 
considerable variation in per-unit costs requires more research 
on the determinants of development costs and the effectiveness 
of current cost-containment guidelines. To the extent that a 
property’s development costs can be contained and a 
production program’s objectives still achieved, federal dollars 
can go further.
Further research on the adequacy of the production 
programs’ capital replacement reserves would put the federal 
government in a better position to manage potential long-term 
cost risks. As we previously noted, the production programs 
could pose a cost risk to the federal government if capital 
reserves are underfunded. The experience with modernization 
programs for public housing and other production programs 
suggests that this cost risk can be large. It is still too early to tell 
whether tax credit properties will suffer from capital shortfalls 
as the properties age. However, even if there are shortfalls, the 
structure of the tax credit program may limit the risk to the 
federal government. The government does not own the units or 
hold the mortgages on most of them. As a result, it is not clear 
what the potential role of the federal government would be if 
these units were to need an infusion of capital. It is possible 
that, as the ownership of tax credit properties changes over 
time, new owners will apply for tax credits to rehabilitate the 
properties. However, their applications will have to be assessed 
by the relevant state agencies, which will have no statutory 
obligation to provide the credits.
Our analysis for this paper, which required detailed, 
consistent data on housing characteristics, services, and costs 
for the six active programs, relied on information collected and 
centralized by HUD and the Rural Housing Service but was 
hampered by gaps in the data for some programs. For example, 
HUD’s centralized data on the Section 202 and Section 811 
programs do not include information on the sources of funds 
other than the capital advance. For the HOPE VI program, data 
were available on total costs and on HUD’s portion of the total 
costs, but information on tax credits and state, local, and 
private funds was limited.34 To varying degrees, HUD and RHS 
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and expenses. Cooperation and coordination across federal 
agencies to establish standards for collecting data on housing 
programs would facilitate the development of information to 
further our understanding of federal housing programs.
For the tax credit program, no federal agency is responsible 
for collecting and centralizing data from the state and local 
housing finance agencies that administer the program. 
Although the Internal Revenue Service oversees compliance 
with the federal regulations for using tax credits, it does not 
oversee the program’s impact on national housing policy, 
including its relationship to other federal housing programs. 
Recognizing the importance of the tax credit program, HUD 
established a limited national database on tax credit properties. 
This database has information, which the housing finance 
agencies have voluntarily reported to HUD, on the properties 
placed in service through 1998, including their location, 
number of units, number of bedrooms per unit, type of 
construction (new or rehabilitated), and type of sponsor 
(nonprofit or for-profit). However, HUD’s database does not 
include information on tenant characteristics, project costs, 
and property operating revenues and expenses. These data, 
though generally available from the housing finance agencies, 
have not been centralized, making analysis and evaluation of 
the program difficult. As a result, for this paper, we relied on a 
database constructed by a private research firm.
Given the size of the tax credit program—soon to exceed 
$4 billion per year—it is important to monitor and evaluate the 
program’s impact on national housing policy. However, no 
federal agency has been designated to perform this role, and no 
requirements have been established for state finance agencies 
to report data on project costs and households served. 
Accordingly, there is a need for a national, centralized database 
on the tax credit program to serve as the basis for evaluating the 
program’s success in serving various populations, assessing 
how federal funds are being used, determining to what extent 
other sources of funding are being leveraged, gauging projects’ 
compliance with cost-containment guidelines, and monitoring 
projects’ ongoing and long-term financial viability. To develop 
this database, a federal agency would have to be explicitly 
designated as responsible for collecting the information and 
establishing reporting requirements for the housing finance 
agencies that manage the program. The costs and benefits of 
designating such an agency and requiring more detailed 
reporting by the housing finance agencies would have to be 
weighed before any action is taken.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / June 2003 161
Housing Vouchers
We obtained  from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) data on gross rents, housing assistance 
payments, tenant contributions, and incomes for the housing 
voucher and certificate programs for about 1.4 million 
households participating in the programs in 2000 from the 
Multifamily Tenant Characteristics System. We also collected 
information from HUD and individual housing authorities on 
the average administrative fee paid to housing authorities.
Low-Income Housing Tax Credits
The tax credit program is decentralized by nature, which means 
there is no national database to evaluate the program’s 
characteristics, including costs. Consequently, we relied 
extensively on rent and development cost data collected and 
analyzed by City Research, a private research firm in Boston. 
City Research assembled and analyzed detailed data on more 
than 2,500 tax credit properties, with more than 150,000 units, 
that were acquired by four national syndicators.35 These units 
were estimated to represent about 25 percent to 27 percent of 
those generated under the program from 1987 through 1996.36 
City Research’s data were supplemented with data we collected 
on tax credit properties placed in service in 1999 within the 
seven metropolitan areas.
HOPE VI
We obtained from HUD data on the total development costs for 
130 planned and completed HOPE VI developments, which 
contained about 63,560 planned units as of 2000. Approximately 
10 percent of these properties were either completed or 
substantially completed. HOPE VI properties use multiple 
sources of funding, but the data were not sufficiently detailed to 
break out funding by individual sources other than HUD. For 
properties in the seven metropolitan areas, we contacted public 
housing authorities and were able to obtain complete data on 
their sources of funds. For our national cost estimate, we based 
the distribution of costs paid by state, local, and private entities on 
the actual cost shares in our seven metropolitan areas. The 
properties in the seven metropolitan areas constituted about 
20 percent of the units in our HOPE VI inventory. The HOPE VI 
program also funds various types of activities (for example, 
property demolition, tenant relocation, and community services) 
in addition to housing-related construction. We estimated both 
housing-related and all costs for the HOPE VI program.
In general, HUD does not have public housing data on 
revenues and expenses on a property-by-property basis. This 
information is also not available for the HOPE VI program. 
Consequently, to estimate a national rent for the HOPE VI 
program, we obtained from HUD the average tenant rental 
contribution and operating subsidy paid by HUD for all public 
housing units. Together, these payments constitute an 
approximation of a traditional rental payment.
Section 202 and Section 811
HUD identified about 135 properties, comprising about 6,040 
units that were placed in service nationwide in fiscal year 1998 
under the Section 202 program, and about 115 properties, 
comprising about 1,420 units, under the Section 811 program. 
From the list provided, we contacted thirty-nine HUD field 
offices to get detailed data on the properties’ total development 
costs and the sources of funds used to pay these costs. We also 
obtained data from the field offices on properties’ rents. Most of 
the seven metropolitan areas did not have enough properties 
placed in service in 1998 for us to compute meaningful averages 
for development costs and rents. Consequently, we asked the 
field offices to identify the properties placed in service from 1996 
to 1999 to ensure that we would have at least four properties 
under each program to compute such averages better.
Section 515
Rural Housing Service state offices identified 53 Section 515 
properties, containing about 1,250 units, which were placed in 
service in fiscal year 1998. The state offices provided data on 
total development costs, including the sources and terms of 
funds used to finance these costs. The state offices also 
provided information on 1999 rents. We excluded Section 515 
from our analysis of the seven metropolitan areas because it is 
a rural program. 
Appendix: Data SourcesEndnotes
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1. Federal rental assistance programs define “low-income” house-
holds as those with incomes below 80 percent of the area median 
income and “very low-income” households as those with incomes 
below 50 percent of the area median income.
2. See Keyes and DiPasquale (1990). 
3. This analysis does not treat the HOME Investment Partnerships 
program as a separate production program because HOME grants are 
often used in conjunction with other housing production programs. 
The HOME funds provided with the production programs discussed 
in this paper are included in our analyses of these programs’ costs.
4. HOPE VI is actually a modernization program. In this paper, we 
classify HOPE VI as a production program because it is currently the 
only major construction effort in public housing. Since 1996, public 
housing has not received new appropriations to fund the development 
of new, incremental units.
5. The Section 202 Direct Loan program, which is no longer active, 
developed more than 200,000 units for elderly households and, to a 
lesser extent, for persons with disabilities. In 1990, Congress converted 
Section 202 to a grant program and established the Section 811 
program to provide housing for persons with disabilities.
6. We include outlays for rental assistance provided to Section 515 
units under the Section 521 program. Section 521 is a Rural Housing 
Service (RHS) program within the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
that provides rental assistance to nearly all units currently developed 
under Section 515. 
7. See Weicher (1990). 
8. See Wallace et al. (1981). 
9. See Olsen (2000, 2001). 
10. The studies reviewed include U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (1974), Mayo et al. (1980), Olsen and Barton 
(1983), and Wallace et al. (1981).
11. This average does not include tax credit properties with 
Section 515 mortgages. The average size of tax credit properties with 
Section 515 mortgages is thirty-three units. The average size of all tax 
credit properties is fifty-nine units.
12. This percentage excludes tax credit units in properties with 
Section 515 mortgages because we included these units in our 
calculations for the Section 515 program. If these units were included 
in our calculations for tax credits, the percentage of units in non-
metropolitan areas would increase to about 22 percent from about 
6p e r c e n t .  
13. For all of the present value calculations, we assumed a discount 
rate of 6 percent, which was the government cost of funds according 
to 1999 data published by the Office of Management and Budget. 
14. We did not include the costs incurred by federal agencies (HUD, 
the Rural Housing Service, and the Internal Revenue Service) to 
administer and monitor the programs, since these costs are not 
identified in sufficient detail in the agencies’ records. However, we 
believe these costs to be extremely small relative to those costs that we 
have accounted for. In addition, we did not include the cost to the 
government in forgone taxes due to depreciation because the rationale 
for the depreciation deduction in tax law is to permit investors to 
realize the real costs associated with a structure’s wearing out over 
time. However, to the extent that a building’s tax life (27.5 years) is 
generally shorter than its economic life, some portion of the 
depreciation benefit may be viewed as a subsidy.
15. For this analysis, we assumed a 3 percent rate of annual rent 
inflation based on a ten-year average national rate for rental housing 
according to the consumer price index. Although we assumed the 
same annual rate of rent inflation for both production programs and 
vouchers, production program rents tend to be lower than voucher 
rents because of development subsidies (see Table 3). As a result, 
voucher costs rise more with rent inflation than production costs. 
With rent inflation, increasing the number of years for the analysis 
decreases the difference in total costs between production programs 
and vouchers.
16. We estimated the interest subsidies using the same procedure we 
used for Section 515 below-market loans.
17. As discussed in the previous section, these estimates assume 
annual rent inflation of 3 percent. In U.S. General Accounting Office 
(2002), we estimate program costs using different assumptions about 
the rate of rent inflation. Assuming a higher rate of rent inflation 
narrows the gap in costs between vouchers and the production 
programs; lower rent inflation widens the gap.Endnotes (Continued)
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18. We took the actual voucher rents for two- and three-bedroom 
units and interpolated a rent consistent with the average bedroom size 
of 2.4 for the HOPE VI program.
19. For some of the programs reviewed, variances in the costs of 
individual properties in certain locations can also be due to their small 
sample sizes.
20. A detailed discussion of the impact of housing characteristics and 
public amenities on housing rents is found in DiPasquale and 
Wheaton (1996, chapters 3, 4, and 14). 
21. For a discussion of the impact of property and neighborhood 
characteristics on total development costs for the tax credit program, 
see Cummings and DiPasquale (1999) and U.S. General Accounting 
Office (1999). For more information, HUD’s Office of Policy 
Development and Research (1982) measured the differences in total 
development costs among the inactive housing production programs.
22. Also see Cummings and DiPasquale (1999, pp. 260-1).
23. One HUD study estimates that modernization needs of public 
housing are nearly $20,000 per unit. If these needs were met, the 
ongoing annual accrual needs of public housing are estimated at 
almost $1,700 per unit. See Finkel et al. (2000). However, given the 
unique nature of public housing, its history may not shed much light 
on the future of other current programs. Perhaps more relevant, 
another HUD study estimates that the annual accrual needs of Federal 
Housing Association (FHA)-insured multifamily properties are 
almost $1,100 per unit. In addition, see Finkel et al. (1998).
24. This percentage represents an increase of $35,220 to the total 
thirty-year cost of $223,190 for the HOPE VI program. Our estimate 
of this increase is based on the national average property tax rate of 
$11 per $1,000 of property value, according to the 1999 American 
Housing Survey (U.S. Census Bureau 1999), and an annual set-aside 
of $600 per unit. About 25 percent of this increase is attributable to 
shortfalls in capital reserves and 75 percent to property tax 
abatements. Interviews with industry officials indicate that annual 
set-asides for new construction under the tax credit program are about 
$300 per unit. HUD officials, however, argue that the history of public 
housing and other federal multifamily housing programs suggests that 
a set-aside of about $1,000 per unit is more appropriate. When an 
annual shortfall of $300 per unit is assumed and no changes are made 
to the property tax abatement estimates, our total thirty-year cost 
estimate increases by 14 percent. When $1,000 per unit is assumed, 
our total thirty-year cost estimate increases by 18 percent.
25. Life-cycle analysis narrows the gap between voucher costs and 
production costs because of the impact of rent inflation on voucher 
costs. The U.S. General Accounting Office (2002, p. 54) reported 
first-year and life-cycle costs for each of the programs by unit size. The 
total first-year costs for two-bedroom tax credit units in metro areas 
were 35 percent greater than the same costs for two-bedroom voucher 
units. The total thirty-year life-cycle costs for two-bedroom tax credit 
units were 20 percent more than the same costs for two-bedroom 
voucher units. 
26. The tax credit program serves two distinct groups. The first group, 
which we estimate includes about 40 percent of tax credit households, 
has an average income of $8,350 (in 1999 dollars), comparable to the 
average incomes of households assisted through the other active 
programs. This group receives rental assistance and pays about 
30 percent of its income for rent. The second group, however, has a 
larger average income of $17,750, does not receive rental assistance, 
and faces much higher rent burdens, sometimes exceeding 50 percent 
of its income. See U.S. General Accounting Office (1997).
27. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (2000, pp. 6-7)—
its most recent report on tax credits—about 57 percent of tax credit 
households paid 30 percent or less of their income for rent, about 
21 percent paid between 31 and 40 percent, about 8 percent paid 
between 41 and 50 percent, about 8 percent paid more than 
50 percent, and 5 percent paid an unknown percentage.
28. Since differences in household incomes and rent burdens can have 
a significant impact on federal costs, we adjusted the rent paid by the 
voucher household to equal the rent paid by the tax credit household. 
We also made similar adjustments for the comparisons between 
vouchers and the other production programs.
29. Because data for the HOPE VI program are not available by unit 
size, we followed the approach used in U.S. General Accounting Office 
(2001) to estimate the program’s federal cost. For the other programs, 
we were able to compare costs across different unit sizes.
30. These contributions are not applicable to the voucher 
program.
31. Our estimate of total government costs may include private 
subsidies. However, these subsidies generally make up a very small 
fraction of the total cost of the programs.
32. See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(2001). 164 Comparing the Costs of Federal Housing Assistance Programs 
Endnotes (Continued)
33. A 1999 study measured the impact of subsidized housing for 
moderate-income households and for low-income households. It 
found that moderate-income, subsidized housing most likely adds 
little or nothing to the total housing stock. In contrast, low-income 
subsidized housing (public housing) has steadily added to the total 
stock of housing since its inception in 1935. See Murray (1999).
34. HOPE VI program officials, however, are revising their data 
collection procedures to provide more details on all sources of funds.
35. The four syndicators were Boston Capital Partners, Inc., Boston 
Financial, Enterprise Social Investment Corporation, and the National 
Equity Fund, Inc. Each of these syndicators has a national portfolio 
and has been active in the tax credit market throughout the tax credit 
program’s history. 
36. See City Research (1998) for results of its analysis of these data and 
Cummings and DiPasquale (1999). Comparisons of  the City Research 
data with those collected by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1997) 
indicate that City Research’s data are quite representative of the 
program nationally.References
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